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RECENT CASE NOTES
taxation which are considered to be arbitrary and unreasonable. If this is so,
it is difficult to understand why the exemption in question does not clearly
merit condemnation as a denial of the equal protection clause, which extends
to all "persons" including citizens of the United States, and "nothing can be
added to the vehemence of the denunciation Ly invoking the command of the
privileges and immunities clause."
If on the other hand the privileges and immunities clause may be invoked
against even reasonable classification, then the door is completely open to the
literal protection of both the fundamental rights, powers, privileges and
immunities of the Bill of Rights, 1 3 and all the fundamental rights, powers,
privileges and immunities of the common law. Thus a protection would be
accorded the privileges and immunities clause and those privileges and im-
munities selected by the court, in excess of that which has been deemed
needful or desirable for the protection of the contract clause, the commerce
clause, and the due process clause. This is substantially the position taken
by Mr. Justice Stone in the dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brandeis
and Mr. Justice Cardozo concurred.
It is submitted that the true significance of this novel protection of the
"privilege of acquiring, owning, and receiving income from outside a state"
is the further protection of personal liberty against social control, and, on
the authority of this decision as a precedent, a possible boundless protection
of personal liberty against social control. In this case social control was
denied the state. In Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States14 and in Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. 15 social control was denied to the federal
government. Any expansion of the social control allowed to the states by these




FRAUD.-The appellee's amended complaint alleged that appellant and three
others, officers of the Marion County Sand and Gravel Company, conspired
to perpetrate a fraud upon the appellee by inducing him to purchase from
two of the defendants, fifty shares of worthless stock of said gravel com-
pany. It further alleged that in consideration of appellee's promise to pay
a note of the company to the appellant then overdue, to cancel an obligation
owed by the company to appellee, and to make another loan to the company,
13Those basic privileges and immunities secured against federal in-
fringement by the first eight amendments have never been held to be protected
from state action by the privileges and immunities clause. See Walker v.
Sauvinet (1875), 92 U. S. 90; Presser v. Illinois (1886), 116 U. S. 252, 6
S. Ct. 580; O'Neill v. Vermont (1892), 144 U. S. 323, 12 S. Ct. 693, Maxwell
v. Dow (1900), 176 U. S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448, Twining v. New Jersey (1908),
211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, Hurtado v. California (1884), 110 U. S. 516, 4
S. Ct. 111, West v. Louisiana (1904), 194 U. S. 258, 24 S. Ct. 650.
14 (1935) 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837.
15 (1935) 295 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758.
16 For a full discussion of the view see Hugh E. Willis (1936), "Con-
stitutional Law of the United States," at p. 927.
The principal case has probably occasioned less comment in the news-
papers and periodicals because it doesn't concern a three letter governmental
agency. However, its constitutional, social and economic importance should
merit quite as much consideration.
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totaling in all, $4,222.50, the defendants, Case and O'Hair, promised to assign
to appellee, fifty shares of the capital stock of the gravel company and deliver
to appellee as trustee, an additional fifty shares which would become the
appellee's property in case of failure to repay the debt. The president of
the appellant told the appellee that the plant of the gravel company was
worth $60,000 to $70,000 and that the stock was worth $400 to $500 per share.
It is alleged that the stock was, in fact, worthless and that the appellee in
ignorance of the falsity of the representations relied upon them. Undis-
puted evidence shows that the appellee was a man of 54 who had had
extensive experience in the road contracting business, that he had personal
knowledge of the financial condition of the gravel company, and was on good
terms with his brother, Bascom O'Hair, president of the gravel company, and
therefore was in a position to investigate the financial status of the company.
Appellee was awarded a verdict of $7,500 damages and the appeal followed
an overruling of the motion for new trial. Held, the court erred in over-
ruling the motion for new trial. Where strangers are dealing at arm's length,
statements of value are regarded as mere expressions of opinion, and that a
person dealing thus, who deliberately ignores facts which are well known
to him and chooses to believe statements to the contrary is held not injured
in law so as to be entitled to recover for misrepresentations in statements
which he chose to believe.1
The Restatement of Contracts defines misrepresentation as any manifesta-
tion by words or other conduct by one person to another that, under the cir-
cumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the facts.2 Fraud
is defined as a misrepresentation known to be such. 3
Fraud becomes of importance in at least three general situations:
(1) It makes a contract voidable and the party upon whom the fraud
has been practiced may rescind or disaffirm such contract.
(2) It is a defense to a contract action when the contract was induced by
fraud.
(3) It furnishes the basis for a tort action in deceit.
The modern position, as set forth by the Restatement of Contracts, Chapter
15, holds that material misrepresentation makes a contract voidable the same
as fraud. Chapter 15 of the Indiana Annotations to the Restatement of Con-
tracts, points out that the law of fraud has been approaching misrepresenta-
tion through the rules as to scienter, and the law of misrepresentation has
been growing through the development of the law of voidability where there
are confidential relations and confidential contracts. The Restatement has
completed this process of development. Of course this refers to fraud in the
inducement; fraud in the execution makes a contract void. The position of
the Restatement is supported in Indiana by the case of Frenzel v. Miller, 4
where it was held that a material misrepresentation make the contract voidable
regardless of whether the representor knew the falsity of his statements or
not. This position has been followed and upheld by many subsequent cases5
' Security Trust Co. v. O'Hair (1935), - Ind. App. -, 197 N. E. 694.
2American Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 470.
3American Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 471.
4 (1871), 37 Ind. 1.
5 Krewson v. Cloud (1873), 45 Ind. 273, Bethell v. Bethell (1883), 92 Ind.
318, Slaughter v- Favorite, Guardian (f886), 107 Ind. 291, 4 N. E. 880;
Wheatcraft v. Myers (1914), 57 Ind. App. 371, 107 N. . 81, Kirkpatrick v.
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To predicate an action for damages, the fraudulent representations "must
be in regard to a material fact, operating as an inducement to the purchase
or making of the contract, and upon which the purchaser or person making
the contract had a clear right to rely; and the party complaining must have
been actually deceived thereby; and, generally, such representation must not
be a mere matter of opinion, or in respect of facts equally open to the obser-
vation of both parties, and concerning which the party complaining, had he
exercised ordinary prudence, could have attained correct knowledge." 6
Representations as to quality and value of the subject matter have quite
generally been held not to be actionable upon the theory that they are mere
expressions of opinion and that no one has the right to rely on another's
opinion-especially where the parties are dealing adversely. So, the rule
of caveat emptor has been applied to this situation in which parties stand
on equal footing, with an equal opportunity to investigate. In recent years
this ancient dogma has been subjected to an increasing array of limitations.
Thus, today, representations as to value may be made under such circum-
stances as to be actionable if false and productive of injury; they are then
usually held to be statements of fact rather than of opinion. 7 When a fidu-
ciary relationship exists between the parties,8 or one party has or professes
to have expert knowledge or knowledge superior to that of the other party,9
or where the pertinent facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of one
partyiO or where physical or mental incapacities render one party inferior in
ability to bargain, 11 or where one party does not have the opportunity to
itivestigate,X2 then representations of value are held to be statements of fapt
and, if false, may become the basis of a tort action.
While in some cases the manifestation is clearly but an expression of
opinion and in others is clearly a statement of fact, there remains a great
number of borderline situations. Into this latter class generally fall the cases
involving representations of value. It has been repeatedly held in Indiana
that this is a question for the jury to determine.1a It appears, then, that there
-can be no hard and fast line drawn between statements of opinion and those
of fact, nor can a definition be formulated which will accurately determine
whether a representation of value will be an expression of fact or an expres-
sion of opinion. If such a definition were possible, perhaps it would not be
Reeves (1889), 121 Ind. 280, 22 N. E. 139; New v. Jackson (1912), 50 Ind.
App. 120, 95 N. E. 328, Furnas v. Friday (1885), 102 Ind. 129, 1 N. E. 296,
Roller v. Blair (1884), 96 Ind. 203.
6Frenzel v. Miller (1871), 37 Ind. 1.
7 Ferrell v. Hunt (1919), t89 Ind. 45, 124 N. E. 745.
8 Manley v. Felty (1896), 146 Ind. 194, 45 N. E. 74, and cases cited
therein at p. 199.
9Merchant's National Bank of Massilon, Ohio v. Nees (1915), 62 Ind.
App. 290, 110 N. E. 73, Culley v. Jones (1904), 164 Ind. 168, 73 N. E. 94,
Judy v. Jester (1912), 53 Ind. App. 74, 100 N. E. 15, Armstrong v. White
(1893), 9 Ind. App. 588, 37 N. E. 28.
10 Bloomer, Administratrix v. Gray (1894), 10 Ind. App. 326, 37 N. E. 819.
11 Bloomer, Administratrix v. Gray (1894), 10 Ind. App. 326, 37 N. E. 819;
Culiey v. Jones (1904), 164 Ind. 168, 73 N. E. 94.
12Armstrong v. White (1893), 9 Ind. App. 588, 37 N. E. 28; Bolds v.
Woods (1893), 9 Ind. App. 657, 36 N. E. 933.
13 Culley v. Jones (1904), 164 Ind. 168, 3 N. E. 94, Stauffer v. Hulwick
(1911), 176 Ind. 410, 96 N. E. 154, New v. Jackson (1911) 50 Ind. App. 120,
95 N. E. 328; Kluge v. Ries (1917), 66 Ind. App. 610, 117 N. E. 262.
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desirable since the present nebulous condition permits the courts to attain a
just result by applying the phraseology they see fit. 1"
The court in the principal case said, "Appellants and appellee were
strangers to each other. No fiduciary relation existed between them, and
they were dealing at arm's length, and in such cases, the general rule is that
statements of value are regarded as mere expressions of opinion." This
statement of. law seems to over-emphasize the necessity of a fiduciary rela-
tionship-in fact one might conclude that a false statement of value would
always be considered an expression of opinion and, therefore, not actionable
unless there existed a fiduciary relationship between the parties. That this
is not the law in Indiana is evident from a consideration of the cases cited
in the paragraph immediately preceding. There it was shown that misrepre-
sentations of value are actionable in many situations where no fiduciary
relationship existed and the parties were dealing at arm's length. The estab-
lishment of a fiduciary relationship appears to be of little importance except
in the cases of undue influence, unless it be used to show reliance on the
misrepresentation in fraud cases.
While it is certain that one has no right to rely on the representations
of another when he knows them to be false, the law does not require one to
investigate a representation to ascertain its truth or falsity when he has no
reason to be suspicious. The New York case of Mead .v. BannI4 held that
a false representation by one of the parties to a contract did not put ie other
on inquiry as to its truth. There, the court held, "Every contracting party
has an absolute right to rely on the express statement of an existing fact; the
truth of which is known to the opposite party, and unknown to him, as the
basis of a mutual engagement; and he is under no obligation to investigate
and verify statements, to the truth of which, the other party to the contract,
with full means of knowledge has deliberately pledged his faith." This posi-
tion has been adopted and followed by a considerable number of Indiana
cases.
1 5
In the principal case the court pointed out that, "Both (appellants and
appellee) had the same opportunities for investigation, and there is nothing
disclosed by the record that either party was prevented from making an
investigation. As disclosed above, the appellee was put on notice
" Here the court seems to disregard a considerable number of cases
decided by both of our highest courts following the rule of Mead V. Bunn,1 6
that there is no duty to investigate imposed upon the vendee in such cases by
misrepresentations of the other party. If the court bases its decision upon
either the point that the appellant's misrepresentation was an expresion of
opinion because there was no fiduciary relation, or upon the point that the
appellee failed to investigate, then it is submitted that the case is contra to
considerable Indiana authority.
14 (1865) 32 N. Y 275.
15Kramer v. Williamson (1893), 135 Ind. 655, 35 N. E. 388, Ledbetter
v. Davis (1891, 121 Ind. 119, 22 N. E. 744; Jones v. Hathway (1881), 77
Ind. 14, Bloomer, Administratrim v. Gray (1894), 10 Ind. App. 326, 37 N. E.
819; Boltz v. O'Conner (1909), 45 Ind. App. 178, 90 N. E. 496 Anderson v.
Evansville Brewing Association (1911), 49 Ind. App. 403, 97 N. E. 465,
Armstrong v. White (1893), 9 Ind. App. 588, 37 N. E. 28.
16 (1865), 32 N. Y. 275.
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The court further stated that, "When parties are dealing at arm's length
and one party, in spite of facts well known to him, deliberately ignores such
facts and choses to believe statements to the contrary, he closes his eyes to
the truth and deliberately takes a chance. It cannot be said that he was
injured in law." From this statement it seems -easonable to conclude that the
court based its decision on the assumption that the facts were so obvious to
the appellee as to require no investigation. If this be assumed, the appellee,
of course, had no right to rely on the appellant's misrepresentations. It seems
a little difficult to arrive at this conclusion on the evidence stated, but, if the
conclusion is in fact warranted, then the decision is entirely sound. If this
was the ground for the decision, then the statements of the court concerning
value and opinion and the duty to investigate are mere dicta. It is sub-
mitted that the latter is the only rationale upon which the decision may be
supported. H. S. C.
BOOK REVIEWS
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, American Law Institute Publishers,
St. Paul.
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts is bound in two conveniently sized
volumes. The same general plan adopted by the Institute for all the other
restatements has been followed, namely, a brief statement of the general prin-
ciples of law is printed in black type under a section number. This is followed
by comments and illustrations amplifying the statement of the principle. The"
advantages and shortcomings of this type of treatment have been often dis-
cussed and are familiar to all. No citation of authorities is given. The
omission of citations will no doubt prove a source of disappointment to the
practicing lawyer, but such citations did not seem feasible to the Institute.
Annotators are now at work in many states, annotating the restatement for
their respective states. The better textbooks on trusts will supplement the work
of these various state annotators.
The reporter and several of his advisers are outstanding writers and teach-
ers in the trust field. Other advisers are distinguished practicing lawyers.
The personnel of this group was a guarantee of the high order of scholarship
which characterizes this restatement.
In form, this restatement is simple, clear, and easily understood. Unusual
and coined words and phrases, not in general use by the profession, are
avoided. Comlilicated and involved sentence structure is likewise avoided.
-In these features a happy contrast to some of the other restatements is
exhibited.
Generally, Mr. Scott and his advisers have followed with fidelity their
instructions to state the law as it is and not as- they think it ought to be.
Both in charm of composition and in soundness of legal content an excellent
piece of work has been done. This restatement is a dependable source of
information for judges, practicing lawyers and teachers and students of the law.
In one major omission the profession will, I think, be disappointed. The
subject of constructive trusts is omitted and will be dealt with in the Restate-
ment of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. Any supposed scientific advantages
of omitting the constructive trust from this restatement and including it with
